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Supreme Court No. 99414-5
(COA No. 52919-0-II)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL R. WEST,

Petitioner.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY

PETITION FOR REVIEW

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A. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER

Michael West, petitioner here and appellant below, asks this Court to accept review of the Court of Appeals decision terminating review designated in Part B of this petition pursuant to RAP 13.3(a)(2)(b) and RAP 13.4(b).

B. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

Mr. West seeks review of the decision by the Court of Appeals dated December 8, 2020, a copy of which is attached as Appendix A.

C. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. When a person is charged with failing to register as a sex offender, testimony that they also violated different obligations of community custody constitutes uncharged misconduct that shows the propensity to disobey the law. The Court of Appeals ruled evidence about Mr. West's failure to abide by his community custody obligations was admissible under ER 404(b), after the trial court disregarded the mandatory balancing test required by ER 404(b). In a prosecution for failure to register, is evidence a person repeatedly disregarded other community custody obligations prejudicial propensity evidence inadmissible under ER 404(b)?

2. The prosecution undermines an accused person's right to a fair trial when it encourages the jury to convict the accused due to his propensity to purposefully disregard his other legal obligations. Even though the court sustained Mr. West's objections, the prosecution repeated the argument. Does the prosecution undermine the fairness of the trial when it puts forth a blatantly impermissible theory that a person who violates terms of community custody is inherently a law breaker with a propensity to violate other laws?

3. The State's mismanagement of a case requires dismissal when it substantially delays the trial, impairs the accused's ability to prepare a defense, or forces the defendant to give up his right to a speedy trial in order to receive effective assistance of counsel. The State delayed investigating, did not collect essential records, then changed the charged offense days before trial, directly impacting Mr. West's ability to prepare to meet his charges. Should this Court review CrR 8.3's prohibition of this prejudicial mismanagement?

4. Because the assistance of counsel is a fundamental right and critical protection, a person accused of a crime may waive this right only if the person chooses self-representation with a full understanding of the

importance of counsel, the seriousness of the charges, and the sentencing stakes involved. When Mr. West asked to represent himself, the court did not explain the disadvantages of self-representation, emphasize the importance of counsel, or mention the nature of the charges. Did the court fail to ensure Mr. West knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel?

5. When a person is representing himself, he has the right to a confidential relationship with standby counsel. The court prohibited standby counsel from discussing aspects of the case with Mr. West, even during private conversations, and then barred counsel from preparing once Mr. West gave up self-representation. Did the court improperly interfere with Mr. West's right to prepare and present a defense?

D. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In December 2017, Michael West was living at the Madigan Motel. 3RP 344-45.¹ He registered his address with the Pierce County sheriff's department due to a prior sex offense conviction. 3RP 423.

¹ The verbatim report of proceedings (RP) from the trial consists of four volumes of consecutively paginated reports and are referred to by the volume as designated on the cover page. Pretrial proceedings are referenced by the date of the proceedings.

When Mr. West moved from the motel to his Uncle Charles' home, he registered that change of address at the sheriff's office. 4RP 549-500. But the sheriff's office database did not show this later change of address. 3RP 452.

On December 16, 2017, police officer Jerry Vahle was doing routine checks to verify registration addresses. 2RP 236. The motel desk said Mr. West recently moved out. 2RP 240-41, 3RP 509. The prosecution charged Mr. West with failing to register as a sex offender from December 4 through 16, 2017. 2RP 242-43; CP 3.

Shortly before Mr. West's scheduled trial for this charge, Officer Vahle returned to the motel because he could not find the records. 3RP 509. A motel clerk gave him evidence that Mr. West was still living at the motel on December 4th, and stayed through December 8, 2017. CP 77; 3RP 499, 502. Because a person has three business days as well as intervening weekend days to update a registration address after moving, the records showed Mr. West was in compliance with his registration obligations during the charging period. 2RP 233.

More than six months after filing its charge against Mr. West, the prosecution amended it to accuse Mr. West of failing to register

from December 14, 2017 until April 14, 2017. CP 70. Mr. West objected to the late amendment and belated discovery and filed a motion to dismiss for governmental mismanagement. CP 27, 41-56. The court denied the motion because the speedy trial expiration date was one month away. 10/8/18RP 50-52.

Mr. West was frustrated by his lawyer's efforts and asked to represent himself. 11/2/18RP 2-3, 7. He said he had not heard of the rules of evidence or trial court rules. 11/2/18RP 8-10. The court ruled he unequivocally waived counsel. 11/2/18RP 15.

After some continuances while Mr. West struggled to gather evidence and interview witnesses, the jury trial began with Mr. West representing himself. 11/21/18RP 4, 10; 11/26/18RP 63, 66, 70; 11/28/18RP 84; 1RP 3. The court directed former counsel Eric Trujillo to assist as standby. 11/2/18RP 15. The prosecution insisted Mr. Trujillo was barred from giving Mr. West any legal advice as standby counsel. 1RP 8. The court told Mr. West he could only speak with Mr. Trujillo during breaks and he could not receive specific advice about "what to say or how to argue." 1RP 11.

When cross-examining the first witness, Officer Vahle, Mr. West grew frustrated after the court sustained the State's objections to his questions about mistakes the officer made in his investigation. 2RP 246-47, 265-72. Mr. West said, "I give up. I give up. I am not a lawyer." 2RP 268, 271.

Mr. Trujillo said he would resume representation but moved for a mistrial and said he needed two or three days to provide effective assistance of counsel. 2RP 274, 279-80. The court refused and allowed only a slightly longer lunch break. 2RP 276; CP 191.

Over counsel's objection, the court permitted the prosecution to present testimony from community corrections officer (CCO) Greg Montague. CCO Montague testified he obtained a warrant for Mr. West's arrest on December 11, 2017, because Mr. West was not complying with conditions of community custody. 2RP 307-08. He described Mr. West as frequently absconding and referred to multiple warrants he obtained while supervising Mr. West. 2RP 308-09, 311. These warrants were unrelated to Mr. West's registration requirements because the CCO played no role in overseeing Mr. West's registration obligations. 2RP 310, 336.

An office assistant with the Pierce County sheriff's registration unit, Andrea Conger, explained that a person registers a change of address by filling out a form. 3RP 397, 404. Someone in the clerk's office collects the paperwork later and enters the information into a database, then destroys the handwritten record after scanning it. 3RP 397-400, 471. Ms. Conger admitted mistakes entering information occur. 3RP 476. For example, the database recorded Mr. West's race as White, yet he is Black. 3RP 474-75.

Ms. Conger found records of Mr. West registering his address many times, but found no record he reported a change in his address after December 1, 2017. 3RP 454, 470.

Mr. West's girlfriend Sarat Ouen testified she was living with Mr. West in 2017 and 2018. 4RP 547-49. She went with him to the registration office and saw him with paperwork from registering after they moved from the motel. 4RP 550, 558.

In the prosecution's closing argument, it contended that community custody warrant showed Mr. West decided not to comply with either his community custody supervision or his registration requirements. 4RP 577, 603-04.

E. ARGUMENT

1. Contrary to settled law, the Court of Appeals allowed the State to rely on unrelated probation violations and warrants to prove a person disregarded his obligation to register his address and forgave the trial court for ignoring mandatory ER 404(b) analysis.

a. The right to a fair trial includes the right to be tried for only the charged offense.

An accused person's right to a fair trial is a fundamental part of due process of law. *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 750, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 95 L. Ed.2d 697 (1987); U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Const. I, §§ 3, 22. It includes the right to be tried for only the offense charged. *State v. Mack*, 80 Wn.2d 19, 21, 490 P.2d 1303 (1971).

ER 404(b) "is a categorical bar" to evidence of uncharged misconduct portraying the defendant as having the propensity for committing this misconduct. *State v. Gresham*, 173 Wn.2d 405, 420, 269 P.3d 207 (2012). Uncharged wrongful acts are presumed inadmissible. *State v. Everybodytalksabout*, 145 Wn.2d 456, 465-68, 39 P.3d 294 (2002). A court may not admit uncharged misconduct unless it finds it is (1) material to an essential ingredient of the charged crime, (2) relevant for an identified purpose other than propensity, and (3) substantial probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. *State v.*

Smith, 106 Wn.2d 772, 776, 725 P.2d 951 (1986); ER 404 (b). “This analysis must be conducted on the record.” *State v. Gunderson*, 181 Wn.2d 916, 923, 337 P.3d 1090 (2014).

b. Evidence of community custody violations is markedly prejudicial and not materially relevant in a prosecution for failing to register with the sheriff’s office, and must be subject to ER 404(b).

The Court of Appeals ruled the trial court failed to comply with this mandatory ER 404(b) analysis. But it inexplicably ruled the appellate court weighs the evidence instead. Slip op. at 12 (“Although the court did not balance the prejudicial effect of the evidence with its probative value, we may conduct the ER 404(b) balancing.”).

The Court of Appeals then incorrectly recounted the evidence and concluded the trial court did not “abuse its discretion” because the jury also heard a police officer mention the existence of a warrant before the CCO testified about Mr. West’s frequent violations of community custody, so no prejudice could result. Slip op. at 12-13.

A court abuses its discretion when it does not apply the correct legal standard or does not exercise the discretion required. “A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to exercise its discretion, such as when it fails to make a necessary decision.” *State v. Stearman*, 187 Wn.

App. 257, 265, 348 P.3d 394 (2015). The failure to exercise discretion is itself an abuse of discretion subject to reversal.”

State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 697, 358 P.3d 359 (2015). Contrary to the Court of Appeals, the trial court necessarily “abused its discretion” by not applying the governing legal test before admitting evidence with a high potential to be unfairly prejudicial.

In exceeding its role as reviewing court and balancing the evidence in place of the trial court, the Court of Appeals also misrepresented the evidence’s relevance. Mr. West’s status of being on community custody was not a material issue and the existence of a warrant for failing to obey conditions of community custody had no bearing on the charge. The community custody officer did not enforce or monitor Mr. West’s registration. 2RP 284, 310, 335.

The evidence that he was on warrant status for failing to comply with community custody conditions was far more prejudicial than probative. It allowed the prosecution to paint Mr. West as a person who disregards the law as a matter of routine practice, which is markedly prejudicial in a case about failing to register an address with the sheriff

as required by law. It is precisely the type of evidence that ER 404(b) forbids. The Court of Appeals disregarded this settled law.

c. The prosecution's misuse of propensity evidence undermines the fairness of the trial and should not be tolerated.

When the government argues a defendant has the propensity to commit a crime because of their other actions, it commits misconduct. *State v. Fisher*, 165 Wn.2d 727, 749, 202 P.3d 937 (2009). Prosecutors have a duty to ensure that an accused person receives a fair trial. *State v. Boehning*, 127 Wn. App. 511, 518, 111 P.3d 899 (2005); U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Const. art. I, § 22. Prosecutorial misconduct violates the “fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice.” *Donnelly v. DeChristoforo*, 416 U.S. 637, 642, 94 S. Ct. 1868, 40 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1974).

As a theme for its closing argument, the prosecution argued the community custody warrant for failing to abide by its terms showed Mr. West was “essentially in the wind” and “off the grid” and therefore he would not have obey his registration requirements, despite his testimony that he did register. 4RP 581. The prosecution repeatedly insisted the probation “warrant status” proved Mr. West “was in the wind. He did

not want to be under the rules and the restrictions of either Department of Corrections or the laws of the state.” 4RP 603.

Even after the court sustained Mr. West’s objection, the prosecution again insisted Mr. West’s disregard for community custody obligations proved he failed to register as required. 4RP 603-04. Despite the sustained objection, the prosecutor immediately argued,

This is a simple case, ladies and gentlemen. The defendant made a choice to go off the grid with his Department of Corrections supervision and registration requirements. He knew what he was doing, but he made a choice not to comply.

4RP 604. The prosecutor then immediately concluded the closing argument. *Id.* The very last argument the jurors heard the prosecution make before starting its deliberations was that Mr. West purposefully disregarded his community custody requirements and must have also disregarded the law requiring him to register with the sheriff. *Id.*

Division One of the Court of Appeals acknowledged the serious prejudicial effect of presenting evidence about community custody violations in a failure to register prosecution in *State v. Saunders*, 13 Wn. App. 2d 1023, No. 81037-5-I, 2020 WL 1917515, at *3 (2020) (unpublished decision, cited as non-binding authority under GR 14.1).

The court in *Saunders* held the attorney rendered ineffective assistance in a failure to register case by not objecting to testimony about the defendant's lack of compliance with community custody, because failing to comply with community custody conditions is evidence of "bad character" that is irrelevant to failure to register charge and highly prejudicial.

The Court of Appeals ruling invites this type of prejudicial argument by the prosecution's closing argument even though unrelated warrants should not be used to depict a person as simply a criminal who disregards the law. This Court should grant review of this issue that is likely to arise in failure to register cases and undermines the fairness of the trial by permitting jurors to convict a person for improper reasons.

2. The prosecution's mismanagement of the case delayed Mr. West access to critical discovery and misled him about his charges, prejudicing his right to a speedy and fair trial with the assistance of prepared counsel.

Washington courts protect an accused person's bedrock rights to fair and speedy trials by penalizing the prosecution for simple mismanagement if it causes prejudice to the defense, without any need

to show the prosecution acted with nefarious intent. CrR 8.3(b).²

Prejudice includes forcing a defendant to choose between his speedy trial rights and effective assistance of counsel. *State v. Brooks*, 149 Wn. App. 373, 387, 203 P.3d 397 (2009). Guarding against this prejudicial mismanagement is central to protecting an accused person’s right to a fair and speedy trial. *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 750, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1987); U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Const. art. I, §§ 3, 22.

Dismissal is the appropriate remedy when the State’s “delayed and missing discovery prevented defense counsel from preparing for trial in a timely fashion.” *Brooks*, 149 Wn. App. at 391; *see also State v. Price*, 94 Wn.2d 810, 814, 620 P.2d 994 (1980) (when State “inexcusably fails to act with due diligence, and material facts are thereby not disclosed to defendant until shortly before a crucial stage” it may “impermissibly prejudice” the defendant’s right to a speedy trial or his right to be represented by prepared counsel.).

² CrR 8.3(b) provides:

The court, in the furtherance of justice, after notice and hearing, may dismiss any criminal prosecution due to arbitrary action or governmental misconduct when there has been prejudice to the rights of the accused which materially affect the accused’s right to a fair trial.

The prosecution's belated amendment of charges may also constitute prejudicial governmental mismanagement, requiring dismissal. *State v. Michielli*, 132 Wn.2d 229, 937 P.2d 587 (1997); CrR 8.3(d); CrR 2.1(d) (prosecution may not amend information if it prejudices substantial rights of defendant).

On March 22, 2018, the prosecution charged Mr. West with failing to register as a sex offender from December 4 through 16, 2017. CP 3, 51. He was arrested and sat in jail, unable to post bail, waiting for his trial. CP 51. He objected to delaying his trial. *Id.*

On September 26, 2018, six days before trial, the prosecution changed the factual basis of the charge and acknowledged it had not provided the defense with discovery about it. CP 52. It also added a new witness, and struck to other listed witnesses. *Id.* It was no longer alleging Mr. West failed to register from December 4 through 13, 2017. Instead, it was claiming he failed to register from December 14, 2017 until April 14, 2018. CP 52, 70.

Mr. West objected because he was prepared to contest the initial charge, not the newly altered charge. CP 51-57. He complained that the State had not even investigated or sought necessary records for months,

showing mismanagement that undermined Mr. West's preparation and denied him a fair and speedy trial because it required more delay.

The State's mismanagement delayed the case unfairly, prejudicing Mr. West. The Court of Appeals decision conflicts with *Brooks* and *Michielli*. This Court should grant review.

3. The court improperly ruled Mr. West waived counsel then impermissibly interfered with Mr. West's right to self-representation and due process, depriving him of a fair trial by jury

a. The court must presume a person is not knowingly and intelligently waiving counsel.

A person accused of a crime is guaranteed representation by a competent attorney at all stages of a criminal proceeding, as well as the corollary right to waive counsel and represent oneself. *Faretta v. California*, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975); *State v. Silva*, 108 Wn. App. 536, 539, 31 P.3d 729 (2001); U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV ; Const. art. I, § 22.

It is the judge's role to "make certain" the waiver of counsel is understandingly made by conducting "a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances." *Von Moltke v. Gillies*, 332 U.S. 708, 724, 68 S. Ct. 316, 323, 92 L. Ed. 309 (1948). The court must

ensure a defendant “truly appreciates the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” *United States v. Moskovits*, 86 F.3d 1303, 1306 (3d Cir. 1996) (*quoting, inter alia, Faretta*, 422 U.S. at 835 and *Von Moltke*, 332 U.S. at 724).

b. The court deemed Mr. West waived his right to counsel without discussing the charges, warning him of the disadvantages, and misleading him about consequences of self-representation.

During the colloquy the court conducted before ruling Mr. West waived his right to counsel, the court established that Mr. West had no great desire to represent himself and no knowledge of the requirements of self-representation. The court did not warn him of the dangers and disadvantages of waiving his right to counsel that would impress upon him the importance of counsel and did not mention the nature of the charges in this hearing. 11/2/18RP 2, 4, 8, 11. The court elicited Mr. West's lack of familiarity with any rules governing self-representation and when expressed concern about whether he would be able to appeal, the court assured him there were no limitations on an appeal if he was pro se. *Id.* at 12.

The court did not discourage Mr. West from representing himself or emphasize the importance of a trained lawyer. It assured Mr. West he would keep his full right to appeal, without mentioning a pro se litigant loses the right to appeal based on any of his own failings, and cannot claim ineffective assistance. *Faretta*, 422 U.S. at 835-36 n.46.

Because the right to counsel is “so fundamental,” an inadequate colloquy leading to the waiver of counsel “cannot be treated as harmless error.” *State v. Howard*, 1 Wn. App.2d 420, 426, 405 P.3d 1039 (2017). A new trial must be ordered for this reason alone.

c. Once Mr. West was representing himself, the court put unreasonable restrictions on his communication with stand-by counsel.

Once Mr. West became a pro se litigant, he was entitled to prepare to meaningfully represent himself. *Silva*, 107 Wn. App. at 620-22. Here, the court appointed standby counsel to “assist” and ensure Mr. West had access to the information he needed to represent himself. 11/2/18RP 15. But the court ruled that Mr. West could not “get direction or advice from your standby counsel” other than during breaks. 1RP 11. And the court limited the content of what standby counsel could say during any in or out of court conversations, ordering that counsel was not permitted to “coach” Mr. West “on what to say or how to argue,” at any time. 1RP 11.

As a pro se litigant, Mr. West had the right to make decisions about how to proceed. The court interfered with this right by limiting

the substantive content of any questions Mr. West could ask his standby counsel or the nature of standby counsel's responses.

Pro se, Mr. West did not know how to cross-examine the first police witness about the errors he made in his investigation. 2RP 246-47, 265-72. After Officer Vahle testified, Mr. West said, "I give up. I give up. I am not a lawyer. I can't ask the questions right." 2RP 271. Mr. West said, "I don't stand a chance" and gave up representing himself. 2RP 273-4.

Standby counsel agreed he was required to step in but he moved for a mistrial, or at least a two or three day continuance. 2RP 274. He said he could not provide effective assistance and would need time to prepare. 2RP 274, 279-80. The court refused to grant a mistrial or continue the case, and gave a little extra time over lunch. 2RP 276.

The court's improper pro se colloquy and restrictions on Mr. West's access to advice from stand-by counsel, followed by its refusal to allow counsel time to prepare undermined the fairness of the proceedings and denied Mr. West his presumptive right to counsel. This Court should grant review.

F. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner Michael West respectfully requests that review be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4(b).

DATED this 7th day of January 2021.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Nancy P. Collins". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first letters of the first and last names being capitalized and prominent.

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APPENDIX A

December 8, 2020

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL RENE WEST,

Appellant.

No. 52919-0-II

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MELNICK, J. — Michael West appeals from his conviction for failing to register as a sex offender. West argues the trial court violated his right to a fair trial by denying his pretrial motion to dismiss, by violating his right to self-representation, and by improperly admitting propensity evidence. West also argues the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by repeatedly referring to propensity evidence during closing arguments. We affirm.

FACTS

In 1995, a jury convicted West of two sex crimes that required him to register as a sex offender. As part of the registration requirement, West had to notify the sheriff of his change of address within three business days of moving. RCW 9A.44.130(5)(a).

West failed to register his new address after moving out of a hotel where he temporarily resided. A police officer investigated and initially determined that West had checked out of the hotel on December 4, 2017.

The State initially charged West with failing to register as a sex offender for the period of December 8, 2017 to December 16, 2017. However, in September 2018, after further

investigation, the State discovered it had incomplete records. Additional research revealed that West had checked out of the hotel on December 8, 2017.

On September 26, the State informed West that it would be amending the charge to allege the crime occurred from December 14, 2017 to April 14, 2018. In response, West filed a motion to dismiss under CrR 8.3(b), claiming the State had mismanaged discovery.

On October 1, the day before the original trial date, the court considered the State's motion to amend the charge and West's motion to dismiss. The State requested a continuance to October 9 so it could review West's motion to dismiss, which the court granted.

On October 9, the trial court heard arguments pertaining to West's motion to dismiss. West argued the State mismanaged the investigation and delayed providing him discovery, which prejudiced his right to a fair and speedy trial. The court ruled West suffered no prejudice from the amended charge because the time period in the new charge included the originally charged time. Additionally, West's theory of defense did not change. West had prepared to defend the case by showing that he had registered with the sheriff's office sometime between December 4 and December 17, 2017. The court reasoned this defense would be the same for the amended charge. In addition, the court noted that the time for trial would not expire for more than a month.

The court concluded the circumstances surrounding the State's delay in providing discovery did not affect West's rights to a fair trial and did not constitute arbitrary action, misconduct, or mismanagement under CrR8.3(b).

Later that day, West moved to continue the trial to November 28, 2018. The court granted the continuance.

On November 2, West moved to waive counsel and proceed as a self-represented litigant (SRL). West stated three times that he wanted to proceed without counsel. During the subsequent

colloquy, the court and West discussed the dates charged in the information. The court informed West he would have to follow the rules of evidence and criminal procedure, and that if he testified, he must do so in question and answer format. The court also told West that his sentence if convicted would be between 43 to 57 months and a maximum fine of \$20,000. The court granted West's request to proceed as an SRL. The court also appointed standby counsel.

At the start of the trial on December 11, the State objected to West seeking legal advice from his standby counsel. The court determined that to prevent confusion about West's SRL status, standby counsel had to sit behind West and could only provide legal advice off the record and outside the presence of the jury.

On the morning of December 12, after struggling to cross-examine the prosecution's first witness, West requested that his counsel be reappointed. The trial court granted that request. West moved for a mistrial and a two-to-three day continuance. The court denied both the motion for a mistrial and the motion to continue. The court did recess the case until later in the afternoon and it did allow West to recall the first witness.

During the trial, the State sought to admit testimony from West's community corrections officer (CCO) to help it prove its case. The CCO would address four topics. First, he would testify that West was subject to community custody conditions. Second, the CCO would testify that West knew he was subject to the sex offender registration requirement which would show West knowingly violated it. Third, the CCO would testify that West had resided at the hotel. Finally, the CCO would testify that West had violated his community custody conditions by not contacting his CCO or the sheriff's department, and that a warrant had been issued for these failures. A prior witness had already testified regarding the existence of the same warrant.

The trial court ruled that the testimony was relevant and admissible for the purposes of proving West was subject to community custody conditions, that West knew he was required to register, that West had lived in the hotel, and that West had an outstanding warrant. The court excluded any evidence that West had violated his community custody conditions. The court allowed the CCO to state that a warrant existed. In ruling, the court reasoned the testimony about the warrant was harmless because the existence of the warrant had already been established through other testimony. The court did not explicitly conduct an ER 404(b) balancing test on the record.

West's CCO testified that he told West he had to register as a sex offender with the sheriff's department, that he knew West was staying at the hotel, that West was subject to community custody conditions, and that a warrant had been issued for West.

Finally, West's CCO testified that West had violated his community custody conditions, to which West objected. The court sustained the objections and instructed the jury to disregard this testimony.

During closing arguments, the State argued its theory of the case and told the jury it should abide by the jury instructions and use common sense to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. It also argued that West had presented no physical evidence that he had registered. The State also argued that West was "in the wind" and used the evidence of his violation of community custody conditions to argue West did not want to comply with the Department of Corrections or state law. Report of Proceedings (RP) (Dec. 17, 2018) at 603. The defense objected, and the court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard this argument. The State went on to argue that West went "off the grid" in regard to his community custody conditions and his registration requirement. RP at 603-04.

The jury convicted West of one count of failure to register as a sex offender. West appeals.

ANALYSIS

I. MOTION TO DISMISS

West argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to dismiss his case. He argues he suffered prejudice because the State mismanaged his case. We disagree.

We review a trial court's CrR 8.3(b) ruling for abuse of discretion. *State v. Michielli*, 132 Wn.2d 229, 240, 937 P.2d 587 (1997); *State v. Brooks*, 149 Wn. App. 373, 384, 203 P.3d 397 (2009). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. *Michielli*, 132 Wn.2d at 240; *Brooks*, 149 Wn. App. at 384.

Under CrR 8.3(b), the court, "in the furtherance of justice, after notice and hearing, may dismiss any criminal prosecution due to arbitrary action or governmental misconduct when there has been prejudice to the rights of the accused which materially affect the accused's right to a fair trial."

Before a trial court may dismiss charges under CrR 8.3(b), a defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence "(1) arbitrary action or governmental misconduct and (2) prejudice affecting the defendant's right to a fair trial." *State v. Rohrich*, 149 Wn.2d 647, 654, 71 P.3d 638 (2003) (quoting *Michielli*, 132 Wn.2d at 240). Governmental misconduct need not be evil or dishonest; simple mismanagement is sufficient. *State v. Blackwell*, 120 Wn.2d 822, 831, 845 P.2d 1017 (1993). Violations of obligations under the discovery rules can support a finding of governmental misconduct. *See Brooks*, 149 Wn. App. at 375.

A defendant who brings a motion to dismiss under this rule must prove prejudice because of the state's arbitrary action or the state's misconduct. *Michielli*, 132 Wn.2d at 240-41. In *Michielli*, the prosecution amended charges five days before trial. 132 Wn.2d at 243-44. The

court determined that the amendment constituted misconduct because the prosecution possessed all the information necessary to amend the charges several months beforehand. *Michielli*, 132 Wn.2d at 244. The court concluded the only reason the prosecution waited was to harass the defense. *Michielli*, 132 Wn.2d at 244. The amendment prejudiced the defendant for two reasons. *Michielli*, 132 Wn.2d at 244. First, the state added four serious charges, which required additional time to prepare a defense. *Michielli*, 132 Wn.2d at 244. Second, if the defense sought a continuance, the trial date would be beyond the date necessary to satisfy the defendant's right to a speedy trial.¹ *Michielli*, 132 Wn.2d at 244. The court determined that forcing the defendant to choose between prepared counsel and a speedy trial was prejudicial. *Michielli*, 132 Wn.2d at 244.

In the present case, the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied West's CrR 8.3(b) motion to dismiss. West demonstrated neither prejudice nor arbitrary action or misconduct by the State. The court determined that the amended information did not prejudice West because he would not need to prepare a new defense, and West never refuted the court's determination. West admitted he had prepared a defense for the initial period, i.e. he had registered. West has not demonstrated any prejudice.

The court allowed the State to amend the charge based on newly discovered evidence. The new dates alleged in the amended information encompassed the original dates, but slightly expanded them. The State did not allege any new or different crimes. The court did not abuse its discretion in determining the State did not either act arbitrarily or commit misconduct.

¹ *Michielli* only asserted a violation of his rights to speedy trial under a prior version of CrR 3.3. *Michielli*, 132 Wn.2d at 245. He never alleged a violation of his constitutional speedy trial rights.

West also argues that the discovery delays violated his right to a fair trial by requiring him to choose between prepared counsel and his right to a speedy trial.² To support his claim, West cites to *Brooks* and *Michielli*, where the defendants argued that discovery delays forced them to choose between prepared counsel or a speedy trial. *Brooks*, 149 Wn. App. at 384; *Michielli*, 132 Wn.2d at 244. Neither *Brooks* nor *Michielli* support West’s claim. As previously stated, West was prepared to present his defense, and then voluntarily requested a continuance. He also waived his right to counsel. Therefore, West was not forced to choose between prepared counsel and his time for trial rights.

The court did not abuse its discretion by denying West’s CrR 8.3(b) motion to dismiss.

II. WAIVER OF COUNSEL

West argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined West had unequivocally and intelligently waived counsel. We disagree.

A trial court's decision to grant or deny a defendant’s request to represent himself is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. *State v. Curry*, 191 Wn.2d 475, 483, 423 P.3d 179 (2018). A court abuses its discretion only if its decision is manifestly unreasonable, rests on facts unsupported in the record, or was reached by applying the wrong legal standard. *Curry*, 191 Wn.2d at 483-84. Great deference is given to the trial court’s determination because it had “the benefit of observing the behavior and characteristics of the defendant, the inflections and language used to make the request, and the circumstances and context in which it was made.” *Curry*, 191 Wn.2d at 485.

² Although West uses the term “speedy trial,” he is actually arguing that he had to choose between prepared counsel and his “time for trial” rights under CrR 3.3.

A criminal defendant has the constitutional right to waive the assistance of counsel and represent himself at trial. *Faretta v. California*, 422 U.S. 806, 819-21, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975); *State v. Madsen*, 168 Wn.2d 496, 500, 503, 229 P.3d 714 (2010). This right is protected by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 22, of the Washington State Constitution. *Madsen*, 168 Wn.2d at 503.

To validly and effectively waive the right to counsel, the record must unequivocally demonstrate that the accused knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the assistance of counsel. *Faretta*, 422 U.S. at 835; *Madsen*, 168 Wn.2d at 504. At a minimum, a defendant seeking to proceed without counsel must understand “(1) the nature of the charges; (2) the possible penalties; and (3) the disadvantages of self representation.” *State v. Woods*, 143 Wn.2d 561, 588, 23 P.3d 1046 (2001). There is no explicit test to determine whether a defendant’s waiver of counsel is valid, but generally, the colloquy should include the “seriousness of the charge, the possible maximum penalty involved, and the existence of technical procedural rules governing the presentation of the accused’s defense.” *State v. Modica*, 136 Wn. App. 434, 441, 149 P.3d 446 (2006).

The court engaged in a colloquy with West and informed him of the charge, the possible penalties, and the disadvantages of self-representation. The court satisfied the three requirements from *Woods*.

West made an unequivocal waiver. He stated several times he wanted to proceed without a lawyer, even after the trial court questioned him and talked to him about the waiver.

West understood the nature of the charge. The court discussed with West the range of dates that formed the basis for the charge. Additionally, West was present during several motions where the charge was discussed, including the motion to dismiss.

West understood the possible penalties. West knew his standard range was 43 to 57 months and carried with it a maximum fine of \$20,000.

Lastly, West understood the disadvantages and dangers of self-representation. The court informed West he would need to be familiar with and use the rules of evidence and criminal procedure. Additionally, the court told West that the State would not be available to assist him in the rules of evidence. The court also explained the difficulties West would face if he decided to testify on his own behalf. Based on West's answers to the court's questions and descriptions, the trial court granted West's motion to proceed as an SRL.

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled West made an unequivocal, intelligent waiver of his right to counsel and allowed him to represent himself. .

III. ACCESS TO STANDBY COUNSEL

West argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it placed restrictions on West's ability to confer with his standby counsel in the presence of the jury. We disagree.

Neither party argues for a specific standard of review. However, in *State v. Silva*, this court determined that trial courts have discretion to determine what constitutes reasonable access to state resources for self-represented defendants. 107 Wn. App. 605, 622-23, 27 P.3d 663 (2001). Therefore, we review this issue for abuse of discretion.

A defendant who has waived counsel loses the traditional benefits of the right to counsel. *Faretta*, 422 U.S. at 835. A court may, at its own discretion or upon the request of the defendant, appoint standby counsel. *Faretta*, 422 U.S. at 825. However, there is no absolute right to standby counsel by an SRL. *State v. DeWeese*, 117 Wn.2d 369, 379, 816 P.2d 1, (1991). If the court appoints standby counsel, the lawyer "must be (1) candid and forthcoming in providing technical information/advice, (2) able to fully represent the accused on a moment's notice, in the event

termination of the defendant's self-representation is necessary, and (3) able to maintain attorney-client privilege." *State v. McDonald*, 143 Wn.2d 506, 512-13, 22 P.3d 791 (2001). Under article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution self-represented defendants must have reasonable access to state provided resources in order to prepare a defense. *Silva*, 107 Wn. App. at 622.

In *Silva*, the defendant who was in prison, did not have physical access to the law library, did not receive research services from standby counsel, and did not know of the research services available to him. 107 Wn. App. at 623. On appeal, the court determined the defendant still had reasonable access to state resources because he was able to request materials from a law librarian and he was given a list of available materials. *Silva*, 107 Wn. App. at 623. Reasonable access does not mean immediate, unfettered access.

Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it restricted West's access to standby counsel when the jury was present. It provided him access to counsel at other times outside the presence of the jury.

West further argues that the trial court restricted his access to standby counsel to courtroom breaks, and thereby denied him reasonable access to state resources. This argument is contrary to the facts. The trial court only restricted West's access to standby counsel when the jury was present. The trial court made this restriction to ensure the jury knew West was proceeding without counsel. The court did not otherwise limit West's access to state resources, West could confer with his standby counsel at any time outside of the jury's presence. In addition, West requested the reappointment of counsel after one witness, and the court granted that request. It also allowed West to recall that witness for questioning.

West relies on a case holding that when a defendant is represented by counsel, the court cannot interfere with counsel's right to consult with the defendant. *See Geders v. United States*,

425 U.S. 80, 91, 96 S. Ct. 1330, 47 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1976). That case is distinguishable from the facts here because West represented himself.

IV. PROPENSITY EVIDENCE

West argues that the court abused its discretion in three ways by admitting testimony from his CCO. First, the court failed to balance the probative value and the prejudicial effect of the CCO's testimony under ER 404(b). Second, the court improperly admitted evidence that West had an outstanding warrant for violating his community custody conditions. Third, the court allowed the State to use the CCO's testimony that he had violated his community custody conditions to convince the jury he had failed to register as a sex offender. We disagree.

A trial court's admission of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. *State v. Pirtle*, 127 Wn.2d 628, 648, 904 P.2d 245 (1995). An abuse of discretion exists "[w]hen a trial court's exercise of its discretion is manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds or reasons." *State v. Powell*, 126 Wn.2d 244, 258, 893 P.2d 615 (1995).

ER 404(b) governs the admission of substantive evidence of prior crimes or acts. *State v. Bell*, 60 Wn. App. 561, 564, 805 P.2d 815 (1991).

Under ER 404(b), evidence of prior acts is "not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." It may be admitted to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. ER 404(b). To admit evidence under ER 404(b), the trial court must "(1) find by a preponderance of the evidence that the misconduct occurred, (2) identify the purpose for which the evidence is sought to be introduced, (3) determine whether the evidence is relevant to prove an element of the crime charged, and (4) weigh the probative value against the prejudicial effect." *State v. Thang*, 145 Wn.2d 630, 642, 41 P.3d 1159 (2002).

Generally, the ER 404(b) balancing test should be conducted on the record. *State v. Gunderson*, 181 Wn.2d 916, 923, 337 P.3d 1090 (2014). However, a trial court's failure to balance the probative value and prejudicial effect of evidence on the record is not a fatal error if the court identified the purpose for the evidence. *State v. Hepton*, 113 Wn. App. 673, 688, 54 P.3d 233 (2002). Under *Hepton*, this court can conduct the balancing under ER 404(b) provided the trial court identified the purpose of the evidence. 113 Wn. App. at 688.

A. Balancing under ER 404(b)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion because it identified the purpose for admitting the evidence at issue, and its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. The trial court analyzed the CCO's testimony and ruled that certain aspects were relevant and admissible, while other portions would be excluded. The court did not admit propensity evidence. It admitted the relevant evidence to prove West knew he had to register, that he had to reregister when he moved, and that he had been living at the hotel. Although the court did not balance the prejudicial effect of the evidence with its probative value, we may conduct the ER 404(b) balancing.

The probative value of the CCO's testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect. First, the CCO's testimony about the existence of an arrest warrant had previously been admitted without objection; therefore, no prejudice can be shown from the CCO's testimony regarding the warrant. West's CCO also testified that West was subject to community custody conditions, that he had told West to register his address with the sheriff's department, and that he knew West was staying at the hotel. This testimony was highly probative because it was necessary to prove West knew he was required to register, and that he lived at the hotel, essential facts of the State's case. The testimony had minimal prejudice, if any. A prior witness had already testified without objection

that West had an outstanding warrant and other evidence showed that West had previously registered with the sheriff's department and that he lived at the hotel.

For these reasons, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the CCO's testimony.

B. Community Custody Evidence

West's second claim is that the trial court improperly admitted evidence that West had previously violated his community custody condition. West's argument misstates the facts. The court sustained every objection to evidence that went beyond the mere existence of the warrant. At the hearing to determine the admissibility of the CCO's testimony, the court expressly excluded any mention that West had previously violated his community custody conditions. When the CCO did testify that West had violated his community custody conditions, West objected. The court sustained the objections and instructed the jury to disregard the testimony. Juries are presumed to follow the court's instructions. *State v. Lamar*, 180 Wn.2d 576, 586, 327 P.3d 46 (2014).

West argues the prosecution "repeatedly elicited" testimony from West's CCO that West violated his community custody conditions. Br. of Appellant at 41. However, contrary to West's argument, the court did not admit the evidence that West had previously violated his community custody conditions. It excluded such testimony and told the jury to disregard any mention of such evidence.

V. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

West argues that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by referring to West's community custody violations during closing arguments. We disagree.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant a fair trial but not a trial free from error. *State v. Reed*, 102 Wn.2d 140, 145, 684 P.2d 699 (1984). The

burden rests on the defendant to show the prosecuting attorney's conduct was both improper and prejudicial. *In re Pers. Restraint of Glasmann*, 175 Wn.2d 696, 704, 286 P.3d 673 (2012).

In the context of closing arguments, the prosecuting attorney has wide latitude in making arguments to the jury and prosecutors are allowed to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. *Glasmann*, 175 Wn.2d at 704. Courts review allegedly improper comments in the context of the entire argument. *State v. Fisher*, 165 Wn.2d 727, 747, 202 P.3d 937 (2009).

If a defendant does not object during trial, his prosecutorial misconduct claim is considered waived unless the misconduct is “so flagrant and ill-intentioned that it cause[d] an enduring and resulting prejudice that could not have been neutralized by a curative instruction.” *In re Pers. Restraint of Caldellis*, 187 Wn.2d 127, 143, 385 P.3d 135 (2016) (quoting *State v. Brown*, 132 Wn.2d 529, 561, 940 P.2d 546 (1997)).

We evaluate whether misconduct is flagrant and ill-intentioned by focusing “less on whether the prosecutor's misconduct was flagrant or ill intentioned and more on whether the resulting prejudice could have been cured.” *State v. Emery*, 174 Wn.2d 741, 762, 278 P.3d 653 (2012). Prosecutorial misconduct that denies a defendant a fair trial is flagrant and ill-intentioned. *In re Pers. Restraint of Phelps*, 190 Wn.2d 155, 166, 410 P.3d 1142 (2018).

The state commits prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments if the prosecution states its opinions or its comments are highly inflammatory. *See State v. Dhaliwal*, 150 Wn.2d 559, 577-79, 79 P.3d 432 (2003).

We conclude that the State did not commit misconduct during closing arguments because the court correctly excluded the State's improper statements after West objected to them. When the State improperly started to argue propensity evidence, the court sustained West's objections and instructed the jury to disregard the argument. In addition, regarding the State's arguments to


which West did not object, we conclude they were not flagrant and ill-intentioned and that any improper argument could have been cured with an instruction to the jury.³

West has not proven that the prosecution's statements prejudiced him, nor did he attempt to prove that the prosecution's statements were so inflammatory that they could not be neutralized by a curative jury instruction. West did not object to the prosecution's final comment about West's community custody provisions.

West has not carried his burden to show that the State's argument prejudiced him or that any improper comments could not have been cured with an instruction.

We affirm.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.




Melnick, J.

We concur:



Worswick, P.J.



Maxa, J.

³ West did not argue the standard of review or the legal principles associated with prosecutorial misconduct in his appellate brief.

DECLARATION OF FILING AND MAILING OR DELIVERY

The undersigned certifies under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that on the below date, the original document **Petition for Review to the Supreme Court** to which this declaration is affixed/attached, was filed in the **Court of Appeals** under **Case No. 52919-0-II**, and a true copy was mailed with first-class postage prepaid or otherwise caused to be delivered to the following attorney(s) or party/parties of record at their regular office / residence / e-mail address as listed on ACORDS / WSBA website:

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Date: January 7, 2021

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